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I. Introduction
For over twenty years, environmental economists have
dreamed of using taxes and fees to incorporate the costs of
environmental damages into the prices of goods and services.
During this period, the primary rationale for pollution taxes
or charges has been to help ensure cost-effective pollution
control. Properly designed and implemented pollution taxes
can result in achieving pollution control goals at the least
possible cost to the economy. Environmental taxes, or "green
fees," become extremely important as pollution control expenditures nationwide rise past the $100 billion mark annually. In recent years, another distinct advantage of
environmental taxes has also gained increased attention.
* Roger C. Dower is currently Director of the Climate, Energy and Pollution Program at the World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. He is working on studies and analyses to investigate international and domestic policy
options to address the environmental consequences related to energy production and use, public policies to encourage use of alternative energy sources and
energy efficiency investments and economic strategies for reducing pollution.
** Robert Repetto is Vice President and Director of the Program in Economics & Population at the World Resources Institute. Dr. Repetto is the author of numerous publications on economic development, population issues and
natural resource management for sustainable development.
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Pollution taxes are a far superior form of raising government
revenue than most conventional sources of government
funds. Green fees, however, still remain more of a theory
than a reality.
The role of pollution taxes in supporting broad scale fiscal restructuring at the federal, state or local level has the
potential for significant macroeconomic benefits. As a result,
these economic benefits could form the basis for much wider
acceptability of environmental tax-based policies. However,
this new justification for pollution taxes does not eliminate
the significant barriers to their implementation. This paper
considers opportunities for the fiscal restructuring of green
fees and challenges in overcoming other obstacles to achieve
their economic and environmental benefits.
II. The Case for Fiscal Restructuring
In the United States, as in other countries, the fiscal system has evolved without regard to the objectives of environmental sustainability. The United States tax and subsidy
codes convey incentives to the private sector that are fundamentally at odds with those objectives. Most government
revenues come from taxes on payrolls, profits, capital gains
and incomes. Such taxes fall predominantly on "value added"
- the value added to or created in a product or commodity by
the manufacturing or marketing process, exclusive of the cost
of materials. These taxes penalize those activities that allow
for economic progress including work, savings, investment
and entrepreneurship. The disincentive effects have created
large economic burdens. Private incomes fall by considerably
more than a dollar for every dollar collected in tax revenue.
This excess burden has been as high as forty to sixty cents on
the dollar at the margin, for additional tax revenues
collected.
Taxes on value added ensure that government revenues
rise with people's ability to pay. However, from a broad economic and ecological perspective, heavily penalizing value added is counter-productive. Value added is precisely what the
United States is trying to increase, both in absolute terms
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and relative to the materials and energy required to sustain
the American standard of living. To protect the environment
in a growing economy, producers must achieve progressively
greater efficiency in the use of materials and energy while
satisfying consumers' demands for goods and services.
In order to preserve environmental quality, raw materials use and waste generation per unit of product must be cut
by fifty percent or more for each doubling in the national
product. To increase efficiency at this rate, the economy must
minimize the throughput of materials required to maintain
living standards. In other words, the value added to each
unit of resources used in production must be maximized. Yet,
the United States fiscal structure typically taxes value added
and subsidizes the use of natural resources.
Maximizing the value added to all materials used in the
economy is the essence of "dematerialization," "eco-efficiency," or "pollution prevention." These similar concepts are
recognized as the best long-term strategies for environmental
protection. The traditional approaches of treating, diluting
or segregating wastes are increasingly more costly and less
effective in an economy of such vast scale. Much waste treatment amounts to shifting residuals from one medium to another at a substantial expense but with little true benefit.
The. conservation of matter ensures that virtually all of the
twelve billion tons of crude materials that are drawn into the
United States economy each year quickly becomes processed
or post-consumer waste. At this scale, the environmental impacts regarded as "externalities" are not simply localized
problems, but are increasingly regional or global in scale and
cross-media in scope. An integrated strategy for waste reduction is essential, but cannot succeed without support from fiscal systems to provide appropriate market signals.
The burgeoning waste problem makes the economy less
productive due to pollution damages, treatment and disposal
costs, and the ecological disruption caused by raw material
extraction, transport, and processing. Attempts to control
these damages through regulation have become costly and
cumbersome. The United States currently spends two percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on environmental
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control. This figure is projected to grow by almost twenty-five
percent by the end of the decade while regulatory drags on
investment and innovation further reduce future income. Yet
estimated costs of remaining environmental damages exceed
one percent of GDP. However, some important environmental problems, such as climate change, are still not being addressed effectively at all.
III. The Role of Pollution Taxes
Public finance economists realize that corrective taxes on
activities that distort market incentives raise revenue with a
much lower economic burden than taxes that introduce market distortions. Thus, taxing activities that generate environmental damages is more efficient than taxing value added1 or
1. A value added tax (VAT) is levied on a firm's sales, with tax credits
granted to the firm for taxes already paid on goods and services purchased from
other firms. Thus, the VAT is effectively levied only on a product's value added,
the sum of wage and salary payments, profits, and payments to other factors of
production used at various stages of manufacture. If value added were added
up across all firms and enterprises in the economy, it would be approximately
equal to national income, which is the total of all payments to factors of
production.
This raises an important point. National income, or total value added, is
precisely what the United States is trying to increase. In order to improve living standards, we want national income to grow as fast as possible. Economically, value added is a good thing. For this reason, it is generally thought that
the tax rates on value added should be kept as low as possible while achieving
the revenue goal. This implies broadening the tax base to include as many sectors and enterprises as possible. However, broadening the tax base in this way
may conflict with equity goals, which would be served by exempting sectors,
such as food industries, which produce items important in low income household budgets.
It seems clear that a VAT has some advantages over a tax levied on just a
component of value added, such as payroll. A payroll tax, since it has a narrower base, must have higher rates to achieve the same revenues. Therefore, a
payroll tax has stronger disincentive effects to workers. A tax levied on just
some component of value added, such as payrolls, also may distort employers'
decisions regarding the choice of factor inputs (labor and capital) they employ.
By inducing employers to automate labor-intensive operations or move them
abroad, a tax levied just on the payroll component of value added can cost jobs.
A similar case could be made for a tax levied just on the profits component of
value added.
Many think that a broadly-based VAT with a uniform rate avoids economic
distortions. Such a tax would avoid the kinds of gross distortions that might
arise if some sectors were heavily taxed and others were totally exempted.
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income. Creating a fiscal structure to support sustainable
economic progress is consistent with better environmental
quality and more rapid gains in living standards.
Further, shifting some of the tax burden away from
work, savings and other "goods" onto waste generation, pollution, congestion and other "bads" would be an important step
toward "full-cost pricing" that would capture the total environmental costs of the manufacturing and use of a product.
Environmentalists, government officials and businesspersons
are approaching consensus on the concept that greater reliance on market-based instruments can be less costly than
regulations that deal with environmental problems. If environmental costs are adequately reflected in market prices,
then the dynamic virtues of the market economy will help
solve environmental problems without heavy-handed administrative regulation. When waste generation has a price,
then it becomes not only a cost item that polluters seek to
reduce, but also a revenue opportunity for innovative firms
with technologies that reduce wastes at low cost. Policies
that incorporate the ecological and environmental costs of
materials and energy transformation into the profit-and-loss
calculus of enterprises and households are necessary for the
long-run prosperity of the market economy.
IV. Prospects for State and Local Governments
Much of the literature on the fiscal advantages of environmental taxes has focused by design or implication on economic benefits at the federal level. Yet the economic gains
from pollution taxes is likely to be even greater at the state or
local level. For example, state and local tax systems that rely
heavily on income or payrolls impose similar economic burdens as federal taxes on the same sources. While these governments face many of the same budgetary pressures and
environmental spending requirements as the federal governThere will be distortions even with a uniform rate, because the pattern of production and consumption in the economy will shift as a result of the tax. Firms
and industries differ substantially in their abilities to pass the tax along to consumers. Therefore, even a uniform VAT results in some economic distortion.
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ment, they must cope with several additional institutional
and economic forces that result in higher returns from increased reliance on pollution taxes.
While budgetary gaps at the state level have grown over
the last ten years, mimicking the performance at the federal
level, most states have also enacted legislation that requires
annual balanced budgets. By removing the option available
to the federal government of carrying fiscal deficits, states are
forced to look for spending cuts or revenue increases. In
1992, thirty-five states were forced to raise almost $15 billion
in new taxes. Pollution taxes offer the opportunity to meet
these revenue goals without imposing the economic burden of
taxing income or savings.
States and local governments also face an additional cost
if they rely on traditional tax sources for new revenues to
meet budget gaps or to fund their existing tax base. In competing for their share of national economic activity, states
that rely too heavily on personal income or investment taxes
will be at a distinct disadvantage to other states with lower
marginal rates. While industries and economic activities
choose locations on the basis of many different variables,
studies have shown that state and local personal income
taxes have significant, negative impacts on employment
growth. Pollution taxes, as a substitute for higher income
taxes, can avoid the investment disincentive of traditional
taxes. Notably, they can also help create a cleaner environment which is an increasingly important component of industrial location decisions.
Finally, the trend under most federal environmental
laws is to pass greater and greater responsibility on to state
and local governments. Increasingly, these requirements are
not matched by additional funds, leaving states and local governments in the position of failing to comply or exacerbating
already difficult budgetary conditions. Pollution taxes can
create incentive mechanisms for achieving environmental obligations and reducing the impact on "unfunded requirements" on the economic and fiscal condition of the state or
local jurisdiction.
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V. Identifying the Obstacles
Taxing "bads" rather than "goods" implies a major shift
in the direction of fiscal policy in this country. The need for
such a shift is slowly becoming part of the political discussion
and debate on tax policy. Much of this, however, has focused
on the possible introduction of VATs. Public finance specialists extol the merits of VATs - neutrality, inclusiveness and
ease of administration - but overlook their fundamental
flaw. Yet for all their economic and environmental merit in
comparison, pollution taxes remain a relatively undiscussed,
untested and untapped fiscal and policy tool. There are a
number of reasons why this is the case, but three broad categories of obstacles stand out as the primary constraints to a
tax reform initiative around pollution taxes. Each category
suggests certain analytical, institutional and political needs
that must be met if these constraints are to be eliminated or
overcome.
A. Who Bears the Burden: Competitiveness And
Regressivity
Any significant fiscal restructuring creates winners and
losers, even if the overall effect is to produce a large net improvement in income and productivity. Potential losers typically resist shifts in tax and subsidy policy more vigorously
than potential gainers promote them, which presents an obstacle to change. Among the potential losers from a fiscal restructuring involving environmental taxes are highly
polluting or resource-intensive firms and industries. The recent debate on the Clinton Administration deficit reduction
program indicates the political strength and intransigence of
these interests.
The potential winners under a system of pollution taxes
would include high technology, high value added industries
such as finance, information and communications,
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and a range of other service
sectors - as well as environmental and energy service industries. Traditionally, there has been little political support for
environmental taxes from any industry sector, including po-
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tential winners. Without hearing from the winners, it is difficult to offset or neutralize opposition from short-term losers.
Part of the problem is an analytical one. Most economic models readily show the losers but are not as adept in picking out
the winners. Thus, even on a revenue neutral basis, economic studies of various environmental taxes tend to highlight the losers and give little detail on the winners. More
specific and accurate estimates of economic and employment
gains in the winner category could help mobilize those industry segments that stand to gain.
At the same time, it is clearly a political mistake to dismiss the transitional costs that may be incurred by industries
or firms that end up in the losers column under a fiscal restructuring scheme. While pollution taxes and fiscal restructuring may assist in mitigating the costs of macroeconomic
transitions and many of the losers under a pollution tax are
likely to be losers in the long run anyway, it is simplistic to
assume that this will make the problem or costs disappear. A
recent report on carbon taxes discusses various approaches
for compensating industries adversely affected by higher energy prices. 2 Various alternative tax design options could
also be considered, such as phasing in taxes or rebating some
portions. In any case, much more work on practical approaches to compensating losers needs to be undertaken.
Although fiscal systems have not been effective instruments for redistributing income toward low-income segments
of the population, opposition to fiscal measures is often expressed in terms of their regressivity or unfairness. The perceived regressivity of taxes on energy, materials or wastes is
therefore a potent political obstacle, even though many common alternative taxes are themselves regressive. Nonetheless, demonstrating that fiscal restructuring addresses broad
concerns of social justice and fairness is a significant hurdle
to overcome.

2.' ROGER C. DOWER & MARY BETH ZIMMERMAN, WORLD RESOURCE INSTITUTE, THE RIGHT CLIMATE FOR CARBON TAxEs: CREATING THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO PROTECT THE ATMosPHERE 26-28 (Aug. 1992).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/8

8

1994]

POLLUTION TAX FORUM

169

Heavy reliance on social security and other payroll taxes
makes the overall fiscal structure quite regressive, and it
would not be difficult to design a fiscal restructuring that
would help low-income segments of the population. Moreover, the offsetting impacts are enhanced by the effects of
such a restructuring on economic growth and labor demand.
Finally, it is important to consider the distribution of environmental costs and damages prior to the pollution tax. Increasingly, the United States recognizes that lower income
groups bear the brunt of the health and welfare damages associated with many forms of pollution. Thus, they can be expected to receive greater benefits from environmental cleanup.
No matter how fully these effects and results of fiscal restructuring might, in theory or practice, offset the regressivity of pollution taxes, they are unlikely to be enough to
eliminate all equity concerns. There appears to be little public faith in the ability of governments to raise one set of taxes
and lower another. Promises of offsetting impacts from other
tax reductions is unlikely to be accepted as full payment. In
addition, the fact that low income groups may benefit in an
environmental sense from pollution taxes does not address
the income issue. While it may be true that reduced environmental damages have significant value to these groups, they
may still be worse off in terms of their ability to meet other
basic needs.
B.

Public Attitudes: What Does The Public Really Want?

Public opinion polls continue to show substantial support
for environmental programs and spending. In addition, most
surveys also suggest that Americans are willing to pay directly for greater environmental quality. There also seems to
be general support for using economic incentives to promote
environmental quality. In focus groups sponsored by the
World Resources Institute, two counterbalancing views have
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surfaced that are extremely relevant to the prospects of pollution taxes. 3
First, while the focus group participants liked the idea of
using economic incentives, they also supported more reliance
on "command and control" approaches. This is not the contradiction it seems. Economic incentives were viewed as a
useful means of directing investments and helping firms
meet pollution requirements. They were viewed as "rewarding the good guys" and not as being effective "sticks"
which many participants felt were still necessary to ensure
compliance. There was a strong sense that more traditional
regulatory methods were more predictable and certain.
These feelings undoubtedly explain some of the difficulty in
attracting support for pollution or energy taxes from organizations with large grass root constituencies.
Second, while there was some intellectual appeal to the
notion of shifting the tax burden from goods to bads, there
was little active support for the concept. In essence, the focus
group members did not believe that as one tax was raised another would be lowered. There was little faith expressed in
the willingness or ability of governments to maintain revenue
neutrality. Group members' governments would be much
more likely to spend any new tax revenue. This was most
strongly felt at the national level - the focus group participants shared a sense of distrust concerning the ability of the
federal government to do the right thing. In general, state
and local governments were seen as more responsible.
These very tentative conclusions from one set of focus
groups should not be treated as the final word. They do, however, help provide a partial explanation of why pollution tax
policies have not garnered strong public support. A public
that is distrustful of government and industry is likely to demand environmental programs that are centralized, visible
and easily monitored. From this perspective, pollution taxes
or other forms of economic incentives may be useful adjuncts
3. The World Resources Institute sponsored four focus groups on the issue
of energy taxes on June 24-25, 1992 in Chicago and Peoria, Illinois.
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to command and control but are not perceived to be
substitutes.
It was not clear from the focus group discussions how
growing trade-offs between environmental quality and other
economic or social objectives would affect the preference for
command and control type programs. The focus groups were

very aware of the potential tensions, but the role of pollution
taxes in helping to reduce these trade-offs was not well understood. What was clear is that pollution taxes are still an
"inside the beltway" concept. While appealing on several
counts, the economic benefits and merits of pollution taxes
have greater intellectual standing than political support.
C. A Vicious Circle: The Need For Experience
Various user charges on natural resources and fees and
charges related to waste generation or environmental pollution are nothing new. Almost every state has adopted some
sort of environmental fee or charge, and the federal government routinely charges fees for recreational activities. However, much of our existing experience is in the form of
administrative fees that are typically not large enough to affect behavior or constitute a significant tax base. There is almost no institutional experience with environmental charges
as pollution taxes, and few examples of how they might really
work in practice.
The lack of experience with pollution taxes creates a
"chicken or the egg" problem. Successful applications and
uses of pollution taxes can play a key role in convincing policy
makers and the public of their credibility. Showing how one
state or city has used a pollution tax strategy to successfully
cope with a particular problem is an effective marketing device. No one wants to take the first step without the partial
security of a proven track record.
Limited experience with true pollution taxes also makes
it difficult to address the issues of administrative complexity
that surround pollution taxes and, for that matter, most new
tax proposals. There remains significant work concerning issues of pollution tax design. The literature and research on
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the issue of pollution taxes has tended to focus on the theoretical and empirical case with much less attention to actual implementation questions. Technological advances in
monitoring and information processing now make it possible
to implement market-based policies that would have been adninistratively infeasible just a decade ago. Yet there is also
the perception that the transaction costs associated with
these taxes are large relative to the potential tax base, or that
designing an administratively feasible pollution tax will require giving up some of its environmental impact. This latter
concern was quite visible during the recent Btu tax debate.
Overcoming the fears concerning how easily pollution
taxes can actually be implemented will require more experiments with green fees, probably at the state and local level.
Closer working relationships will also be needed with experts
from the public finance communities, such as economists and
lawyers, staff and legislators from tax writing committees, as
well as taxing authorities. The community that supports fiscal restructuring through pollution taxes has to be expanded
beyond the fairly narrow constituents that exist today.
There is tremendous inertia in fiscal policy both at the
intellectual policy and political levels. A sustained long-term
effort will be required to influence the consensus of policy
opinion concerning the economic and environmental benefits
of fiscal restructuring through pollution taxes. Typically
many years pass between the introduction of a new policy
proposal and its adoption on any significant scale. Clearly,
the obstacles briefly discussed here are not going to be overcome overnight. It is going to take sustained effort aimed at a
wide range of audiences to move the debate on pollution taxes
beyond the theoretical into reality.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/8

12

